It is hard not to use superlatives when writing about today's São Paulo. The most populous Brazilian state, the country's biggest agricultural and industrial producer, home to one of the world's largest megacities, its economy would have ranked thirty-sixth in the world in 2010 were it an independent country. In the middle of the nineteenth century, however, the then province in the Brazilian empire gave few indications that it would become an economic powerhouse. How the groundwork was laid for modern São Paulo's emergence in the second half of the twentieth century is this book's subject. Francisco Vidal Luna and Herbert S. Klein, respectively senior Brazilian and American historians and long-time collaborators, recount a history of "extraordinary change" that included "unusual economic growth, population expansion, and international market development of a backward and marginal economy" (302).
This book follows their Slavery and the Economy of São Paulo, 1750 Paulo, -1850 Paulo, (2003 , and carries the story forward to the middle of the twentieth century by which time the state "looked more and more like an advanced, developed society" (257). Klein and Luna devote much attention to the state's administrative and fiscal structures; historians have largely neglected their development, so these substantial sections of this book are a major scholarly contribution. Already in the empire, coffee planters needed an effective state to resolve transportation, health, security, and labour issues; by the early twentieth century, they had a "well-funded and powerful state able to intervene in the economy, to provide public services, and mobilize resources for infrastructure development" (72). Detailed reconstructions of state budgets reveal the state's expanding economic role and its growing capacity to collect taxes. The authors present a wealth of data on railroad construction and (later) roadbuilding, the development of Santos as a major Atlantic port, steam navigation, urbanization, industrial establishments and their output, hydroelectric power, educational institutions, and public health improvement; in all of these, the state played a central role.
The 1905 agricultural census revealed a "dominant and highly concentrated coffee economy" (101); this was far from a monoculture, however, for even coffee planters produced food crops for local markets and numerous small farms existed alongside large plantations. The coffee valorization programs, the destruction of surplus coffee stocks in the 1930s, and eventually the mid-century coffee eradication programs maintained domestic demand, addressed the issue of oversupply, and enabled the post-1950 development of modern São Paulo's mechanized agricultural complex that today produces sugar, oranges, soybeans, and food crops. Industrialization began long before governments embraced protectionism, but benefited greatly from the state's "massive investments in infrastructure" (223). From scarcely 500,000 (less than ten percent urban) in the 1850s, São Paulo's population grew to 8.2 million (thirty-six percent urban) in 1950, thanks to immigration and internal migration, along with continued high birth rates and declining mortality.
Much of Luna and Klein's story will be familiar to specialists in Brazilian history, for they do not depart from the well-established story that the coffee economy's forward and backward linkages begat the industry that propelled São Paulo into its leading role in the Brazilian economy; this in turn underlay the demographic growth and social changes that made modern São Paulo. Their emphasis on the state's role in facilitating and enabling these processes is an important contribution, as are their syntheses of existing scholarship and their integrated account of São Paulo's development. Specialists will welcome the detailed documentation and the wealth of tables, graphs, figures, and maps -159 in total -that present the key data on which this book is based. These also testify to the growing state capacity in São Paulo and the government's ability to collect increasingly reliable social and economic data. A few of the tables, like the one showing the structure of imperial São Paulo's police force (and listing the ranks in Portuguese), seem to have been included only because the data was available, but the rest thoroughly document the state's development and effectively support the authors' argument. Historians of Brazil will long refer to this book; it is to be hoped that Luna and Klein are planning a In Sunni doctrine, the Caliph (in Arabic khalifa, meaning successor) is the successor to the Prophet Muhammad, and the religious and secular leader of the Islamic community. Appointment as Caliph comes about as a result of a contract between a candidate who possesses the required qualifications for office, and one or more "men of loosing and binding." The list of qualifications varies from author to author, but always includes descent from the Quraysh, the Prophet's tribe, and effective leadership in war. This theory was formed by theologians in the ninth and tenth centuries and remained fixed in its essentials. Later theorists, however, had to accommodate the fact that the titular Caliphs -the 'Abbasids of Baghdad -had lost most of their authority to rival dynasties. Mawardi (d. 1058) achieved this by claiming that the new dynasties that had arisen ruled by virtue of a delegation of powers from the 'Abbasids. Ghazali (d. 1111) achieved it by claiming that a necessary qualification for the Caliphate was power, and that the 'Abbasids possessed this by virtue of the support of the "Turks"meaning the Saljuqs -the de facto ruling dynasty in Baghdad. Theories of the Caliphate, it should be added, are found in works discussing religious dogma ('aqa'id) and not in works of jurisprudence, despite their quasi-juristic formulation.
So much for the theory. More important in people's minds was the historical resonance of the Caliphate, recalling as it did the memory of the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs who succeeded the Prophet, and of the 'Abbasid Caliphs established in Baghdad from 750 until the Mongol conquest in 1258. After the downfall of the Baghdad Caliphate, theologians no longer wrestled with the problem of how to reconcile the classical theory with current reality, Taftazani (d. 1389), for example, commenting merely that problem of the Caliphate had become difficult. Instead, the title Caliph became a rhetorical device which rulers might add to their list of honorifics with
